Enhancing RCMP Accountability -- Let's See What Bill C-42 Can Do

On June 22nd, 2012, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews introduced Bill C-42 Enhancing RCMP Accountability Act.


This proposed piece of legislation is 126 pages in length and really does amount to some degree of police reform for Canada's police service. However, it may immediately be suggested that this bill may be trying to square the circle and will not accomplish the truly fundamental cultural, organizational, operational, and functional change that is required by the RCMP.


I had the opportunity to speak with Gregor Craigie, the guest host of CBC's 'Early Edition' radio program in Vancouver on June 26th and presented my perspective on this new legislation:


CBC Early Edition -- June 26, 2012


To add to this exchange, I offer the following further details.


Bill C-42 is police reform in two parts:


1. Seeking to strengthen the RCMP's earlier review body (i.e., the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP) and implement a framework for handling investigations of serious incidents involving RCMP officers.
2. Striving to modernize discipline, grievance and human resource management processes within the RCMP to prevent, address, and correct performance and conduct issues.


I'm more immediately concerned with the new (so-called) Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) which is being proposed. In my interview with the CBC, I observed that perhaps the word Civilian should be placed in quotation marks: "Civilian" as it remains to be seen to what extent the CRCC will be staffed with civilian members. Certainly the Chair and the (up to) four members will be civilians, not unlike several other civilian oversight bodies currently in place across Canada. However, the people actually tasked with doing the investigations could turn out to be seconded, or retired, police officers. To my way of thinking, these people cannot be viewed as true civilians. It may be worthwhile to consider the recommendation of the McDonald Commission in 1977, dealing with the removal of national security from the RCMP and the creation of a new body to deal with these sensitive and vital matters. When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was actually created, there were many former RCMP Security Service officers who simply transitioned to the new organization, bringing their police training, culture and challenges with them into the machinery of this supposedly "civilian" entity.


Certainly, on paper, the CRCC will be an improvement on the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. The new body will have much more robust powers and will have the capacity to function along the lines of a court. Therefore, the CRCC may subpoena witnesses, compel the production of documents and examine issues in a more extensive manner. The Chair of this new body will be able to activate its own investigative powers, or, may work in conjunction with other agencies. This is particularly important in light of the recent developments in several jurisdictions across Canada where strong civilian oversight bodies have been created.


Again, this may become something of a distinction without a difference. While there truly are civilians involved with CRCC at the top level it's where the investigations are actually accomplished that we should be seeing more of an effort to ensure a deep civilian element. Some of the other civilian oversight bodies across Canada provide useful parallels, for example:


British Columbia


The newly created Independent Investigations Office (IIO) came into being through British Columbia Bill 12 -- 2011, the Police (Independent Investigations Office) Amendment Act, 2011. The chief civilian director of this body is indeed a civilian. In fact, Richard Rosenthal is a former American prosecutor with considerable experience in the United States with police oversight bodies and brings a wealth of experience to his new portofolio. Also, the legislation allows Rosenthal's position to appoint individuals to serve as investigators and there is provision for civilians "with investigative experience" in support of the IIO. However, the civilian director may also appoint former members of a police or law enforcement agency outside of British Columbia and/or former members of the RCMP. Time will tell if the IIO is able to fasten upon suitably skilled civilians to take on these challenging investigative roles.


Alberta


In this province, the Serious Incident Response Team (SIRT) is headed by Clifton Purvis, a former Crown attorney. In carrying out their mandate, SIRT has several seconded police officers from the local police services (e.g., Calgary and Edmonton), the RCMP, as well as, retired police officers serving as investigators. To my knowledge there are no civilians working within the Alberta SIRT as investigators.


Ontario


One of the earliest civilian oversight bodies is the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). It has had an interesting history with some highly controversial issues arising due to the nature of its work and the struggle to clearly define its proper purpose and relationship with Ontario's police services. Again, the lion's share of SIU investigators are former police officers. This reality has featured in the examination carried out by a former SIU director, Andre Marin during his tenure as Ontario's Ombudsman.


Nova Scotia


Recently, the Province of Nova Scotia introduced legislation creating its own Serious Incident Response Team (SiRT) modelled quite closely upon the Alberta SIRT experiment. In Nova Scotia the civilian head of SiRT is Ronald MacDonald a former Crown who has been charged with leading this organization. All of the investigators in this unit are either seconded police officers or former officers, no civlian investigative staff have been engaged to conduct the work of this "civilian" agency.


Police Investigating Police Research


Certainly, the research conducted by my colleague Chris Murphy (Dalhousie University) and myself on behalf of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP in 2008 clearly shows that the police must have a vital role to play in any credible, competent, constructive oversight body. The typology we developed moved from the completely internal (police-driven) model to a completely civilian (police excluded) approach. The research pointed out that the most efficacious approaches were those that acknowledged the pivotal role the police themselves play in the process. However, the research also stressed that the public no longer accept a system of police investigating police. Therefore, increasingly, civilians will have to become part of the investigative equation and have the fullest range of knowledge, skills, and abilities for this purpose.


In Britian, for instance, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has civilians on strength to conduct the investigations. Their work is considered complete and competent. In fact the IPCC asserts that 75% of its investigative staff should be civilians, not retired police officers. It may be possible to assert that there is nothing magical, mysterious, or mystical about the process of investigation. More careful study of those police oversight bodies that do engage civilian investigators would be useful to provide solid evidence around this assertion.


Should Bill C-42 pass, it will be quite interesting to see how it moves from theory to practice. Of course, a key indicator will be the quality of the Chairperson and her/his other members. But more to the point, who will be conducting the actual investigations and how will their activity resonate with the public interest?


Time will certainly tell!