Counting Cops: Do More Police Mean Less Crime?

A significant article appears in the current issue of the academic journal, Crime & Delinquency:

Kleck, Gary and Barnes, J.C. (2014). Do more police lead to more crime deterrence? Crime & Delinquency, 60(5), 716-738.

With the beginning of the Economics of Policing initiative lead by Public Safety Canada, and the various efforts that have been inaugurated around this project, many politicians, police leaders and policy-makers have been focussed on the right number of police officers required in any given jurisdictions for the delivery of policing services.

We have seen a number of efforts aimed at making these determinations in a, more or less, scientific (or evidenced-based) manner. Research has been done on calls for service and the average time it takes to 'clear' those calls. The calculations may take into account a number of relevant factors including the seriousness of the crime occurrence, time of day, day in the week, and other elements that may provide insights into this area of human resource deployment. Complex mathematical models have been developed to guide this process, including an approach known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is currently being utilized within the Toronto Police Service to assist with personnel deployment.

However, beyond the complexities and adequacy of these approaches, common practice tends to equate the number of police officers with crime deterrence. It is really a simple formula: the more police you are able to put on patrol, the lower your crime rate will be in any given jurisdiction. More police equates to less crime. It's common sense that is readily accepted by the public, it is used by police executives to defend increased budgets and it is turned to by politicians (especially at election time) to convince the public (and the police) that they are tough on crime and willing to pay the price for public safety.

Unfortunately, this is one of those instances where common sense, as well as, the available research moves in an entirely different direction. Remarkably, we have had research on the actual impact of police activities upon crime rates for nearly forty years. In 1974 ground-breaking field research was conducted by George Kelling and his colleagues in Kansas City, Missouri. Well-known as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment this project examined 15 precincts (chosen at random). Several precincts would receive no routine patrols while others would receive four times the normal frequency of routine patrols. Across all measures, it was determined that there was no significant impact on crime rates as a result of any of these approaches. This was measured by police-based statistics and victim survey data. Of course, these results were remarkable and flew in the face of expectation.

George Kelling

 

 

Then, in 1981, research was completed through the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment which served to confirm and consolidate the findings in Kansas City. In Newark, foot patrols were stopped entirely in four areas, new patrols were started in four areas, and existing patrols were maintained in another four areas within the city. Again, there was found to be no difference in crime rates in the experimental or the control areas. Once, again, police activity (regardless of the number of officers) appeared to have no significant impact on crime rates.

 

It should be noted that there was some skepticism among police researchers. However, these remain fairly compelling experimental results that policy-makers need to consider. The police community needs to remind themselves about these evidence-based findings and the academic community in Canada should seriously consider the research value of replicating this kind of field study in the 21st century.

 

Kleck and Barnes speak directly to the common sense view that more police should equate to reduced crime rates:

 

Despite the intuitive theoretical linkage between police activity, individual-level perceptions of punishment risks, and crime rates, no studies have assessed these associations empircally. Purely macro-level research cannot directly assess the deterrent effects of police activity because it cannot directly measure perceptions of risk among potential offenders. (p. 720)

 



What this current article summarizes is the work completed by Kleck and Barnes in 54 US counties. A total of 1500 adult respondents were randomly selected and interviews were completed with participants in April and May of 1998. The dependent variable related to perceptions of arrest risk and the key independent variables included: police strength, jail ratio, and arrest ratio (i.e., actual arrest rates).

Drawing upon their research results, the authors make the following observations:

People who live in places with more police perceive slightly lower risks of being arrested. The negative correlations, however, are quite weak; none of the four correlations between the police strength variable and the perceptions of arrest likelihood were more than .10 in magnitude. (pp. 725-26)

And further:

...police strength appears to have no more effect on perceived risk of arrest among offenders as approximated by self-reported arrestees, than among non-offenders. (p. 730)

These are useful findings that serve to support some of the conclusions generated from the work completed in Kansas City and Newark years ago. And, for those who proceed to argue that police strength would have an impact on crime rates through an incapacitation effect, Kleck and Barnes offer the following statement:

...it is unlikely that increases or decreases in police strength -- even a doubling or halving of manpower [sic] -- could have any measurable effect on the number of criminals incarcerated. Because nearly all prison systems are full nearly all the time, the only factor that substantially affects the number of criminals "taken off the streets," in the sense of being incarcerated, is prison capacity. Police ability to arrest criminals guilty of prison-worthy offenses is never a limiting factor on the number imprisoned, so it is implausible that variations in police manpower [sic] affect the collective incapacitative effect of the criminal justice system. (pp. 731-32)

So, neither increases nor decreases in the number of police officers deployed to operational duties will likely have any dramatic impact on crime rates or the number of individuals arrested for crimes. Again, it would be valuable to have Canadian research to validate the findings of American police academics. However, we can certainly extrapolate from this study to suggest that any results would likely be similar in a Canadian context.

Of major importance to Canadian policy-makers and police leaders is what the authors assert near the conclusion of their article:

Increasing police manpower [sic] levels may have various benefits other than crime control, such as traffic control or the delivery of various public services, or it may affect crime rates in ways that do not involve either increased general deterrent effects or increased incapacitating effects. At this point however, the evidence indicates that police manpower [sic] levels do not affect crime rates by affecting perceptions of risk of actual arrest and punishment.

In light of these findings, policy makers may want to reconsider whether increases in police manpower [sic] bring sufficient crime reduction benefits to justify their costs. Conversely, in time of fiscal crisis, it is worth considering the possibility that cuts in police strength may be implemented without causing crime increases. Even in time of fiscal plenty, it may be worth thinking about alternative investments that are more likely to reduce crime. (pp. 735-36)

These are quite clear statements that should be taken to heart by everyone interested in the adequacy and effectiveness of modern Canadian policing. We can begin to see that on the basis of this kind of research, combined with the historical record of earlier systematic study, that police may provide valuable and necessary public safety services. However, there is no axiomatic relationship between police strength (in numbers) and crime rates. Here again, we could benefit from home-grown research that tests the findings of studies like the one completed by Kleck and Barnes. In the meantime, it is essential that these kinds of insights become an important part of the dialogue regarding the future of policing in Canada.

Police executives are well-schooled in the art of pressing for increased resources; human, financial, technological, and material. This is part of what being an police leader is all about. Politicians are easily convinced of the simple equation: more cops equals safer streets. We often see that during an election that political parties will vie with one another to increase the complement of police officers to combat crime and increase public safety and security. In Nova Scotia a popular "Boots on the Street" campaign was introduced by the Conservatives and sustained by the NDP when they took hold of the reins of power. In 1994, President Clinton made a commitment to hiring 100,000 additional police officers to bring greater safety to American states. This was consolidated in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. A similar initiative appeared on the scene in Canada and was seen as a path to improvement for police services. No research was offered to support or substantiate these new funding initiatives. They were seen to be self-evident and by all means politically expedient.

When Organizations Die

An interesting article has appeared in the latest issue of the journal Crime & Delinquency:

King, William R. (2014). "Organizational failure and the disbanding of local police agencies." Crime & Delinquency, 60(5), 667-692.

The author applies organizational theory to a consideration of the disbanding of 31 local police agencies during the 1990s in Ohio. King looks at structural contingency theory which examines how organizational structure influences efficiency . He also takes stock of the work of institutional theorists and the tendency of organizations to secure symbolic resources (e.g., legitimacy) from external constituents. For King, it is important to clearly consider how organizations respond to their environment.

King found through various research avenues that there were 31 police organizations that disbanded between January 1990 and December 1999. He also sought out 43 comparison locations in order to make certain quantiative determinations. The paper is a summary of the research and King's findings in this instance.

When a police service is disbanded it is typically due to matters of funding or a lack of sanctioning by an appropriate authority. Budget constraints are a common cause of police department disbanding and this may also be tied to a serious decrease in population. Clearly, funding for public safety in most jurisdictions is closely tied to the tax base provided by residents or businesses. When either, or both, of these decline, there is a shortfall in funding for public safety services.

King notes that small police agencies are particularly prone to these challenges. Larger urban centres are more equipped to deal with such challenges due to their size and the capacity to be more flexible in responding to financial crises. He notes:

When faced with a crisis in its institutional environment, agencies will often attempt to symbolically cope with the demands of sovereigns. Large police agencies can employ symbolic responses such as reshuffling personnel, implementing a new training program, lauching an investigation, removing a police chief, or creating a specialized unit. Larger organizations can more readily engage in these symbolic changes because they have the slack resources to create a new unit and the dark corners in which to hide controversial personnel. Large organziations are protected by their size, for size is synonymous with success. (p. 686)

This is an immediately relevant article in a Canadian context. We have seen the dramatic impact of financial constraints appear across the country and many jurisdictions are struggling with their capacity to sustain very expensive police services. Because anywhere from 80 to 90% of the costs of a modern police service are devoted to police salaries, wages and benefits, it is sensible to consider how disbandment might be an option. Of course, public safety needs must continue to be addressed and, therefore, it is often viewed as feasible to explore other options for the delivery of police services.

There has been more than a decade of debate, discussion and deliberation over the process of municipal police costings in Ontario. With major changes to the Police Services Act in that Province in the 1990s it became necessary for smaller jurisdictions to pay for what had been termed "free" OPP policing. Accordingly, many jurisdictions had to make a determination as to the option for policing they would elect to pursue. Several smaller police services were viewed as being "dysfunctional" under these new legislative arrangements and competition ensued between an existing municipal police department and the OPP through their municipal contracting branch.

King notes that there are some emotional, deeply political and community-oriented elements mixed into these local police department disbandments. Certainly, when a different approach to police service delivery is introduced, there may be significant changes in officer behaviour, different accountability mechanisms in place, as well as, new styles and types of policing provided to the community. Several communities that have adopted an RCMP contract for the provision of policing services have seen the magnitude of such changes. This is also the case for several jurisdictions in Ontario which have opted for OPP municipal policing.

King's observation about the "slack resources" that exist in larger police agencies is one that should be of interest to policy-makers and police governing authorities. It was certainly my own experience, working in several large police organizations, that difficult personnel could be "parked" in various out-of-the-way places as their files were dealt with in some manner. Often challenging officers would be hidden in the training department where they would not have any opportunities for operational misadventure. However, it is difficult to quantify the damage the presence of such officers might do in the training realm, especially when they are exposed to new recruits. Also, I can recall having sidelined officers assigned to work in the policy and planning unit with equally questionable judgment as to their value in such a role.

Police executives have become remarkably adept at creating a kind of black box within their budget envelope to allow them to deal with some of the environmental, budgetary and other challenges which King speaks about in his article. The tactic of rolling out a new training or awareness program is common in police organizations across Canada. This is a conditioned response to many organizational crises in policing when a commission of inquiry or an inquest makes recommendations about potential improvements in a police department's delivery of service. There is often no real research as to the absolute need for this training. Nor is their really any careful design of the training to ensure that will address measurable behavioural outcomes. And the tactic of calling in another police department to conduct an investigation is a stop-gap measure that is applied again and again in many jurisdictions. This, of course, speaks to the viability or legitimacy of 'police investigating police' which has been the subject of increasing study in Canada, and elsewhere.

It would be useful to conduct some research in a Canadian context on those police services which have been disbanded for a variety of reasons to see if the causes and consequences mirror the research that King has conducted in Ohio. What has the process of organizational "death" meant in communities which have lost their local police service? What has been happened in areas like Paris (Ontario), Haldimand-Norfolk (Ontario), Nepean (Ontario), of other areas where the local police were replaced by a contract with a larger police service, or changed through amalgamation?

We have a tendency to think of public organizations as being permanent fixtures. They do, however, have a life cycle that is not entirely dissimilar to that of human beings. They come into being at certain points and may pass away when their purpose is completed, or, they no longer serve a viable public purpose.

King cites a couple of articles that are worth pointing to in this context:

• Sutton, R.I. (1987). The process of organizational death: disbanding and reconnecting. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(4), 542-569.
• Weed, F.J. (1991). Organizational mortality in the anti-drunk-driving movement: failure among local MADD chapters. Social Forces, 69(1), 851-868.

Ivan Henry & the Vancouver Police

The October 2013 issue (New Series, Vol. 77, No. 3) of The United Church Observer features an interesting article on the case of Ivan Henry.

Wronged by Gary Stephen Ross

 While the focus of this piece is rightly upon the 27 years that Irving spent in prison for crimes he did not commit, as well as, his life beyond incarceration, I think it's important to make an observation about something deeply disturbing about earlier police practice.

The online version of this story does not include a rather telling photograph taken at the time of Irving's arrest in 1982. It shows a police line-up organized by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). Seven individuals are positioned for possible eyewitness identification. The person who is supposedly Ivan Henry (although he claims he was not even present at this event) is suspect number "12" and is the only one being restrained by three VPD officers.

What is disturbing beyond the absurdity of this as a "fair" line-up is the sense I have that at least three of these so-called suspects in the line-up are more than likely plain-clothes VPD officers themselves. The B.C. Court of Appeal eventually found that this event was "biased and farcical" and factored unfairly in Henry's case. Details of Ivan Henry's 2012 Court of Appeal hearing are available at:

R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 (CanLII)

Certainly, the VPD has made significant strides toward improving, enhancing, and organizing their approach to police line-ups (and other investigative processes and procedures). It is, however, worthwhile to meditate carefully on the fact that the kinds of short-cuts and cynical methods employed to convict someone like Ivan Henry were clearly in place only a few decades ago. The VPD is no small-scale, backwater police department where one might expect somewhat less than "professional" approaches to policing. It is, in fact, chilling to contemplate that the police could so casually contribute to the wrongful conviction of someone like Henry.

It is always to useful to keep the historical record in our mind's eye when addressing issues of justice.

Resisting Organizational Change: What Can Police Leaders Learn?

It is often valuable to dip into the academic literature on leadership for ideas that might support the effort to effect organizational change in police services across Canada. We know that there is growing, and not unreasonable, pressure on police leaders to take stock of the external conditions which speak directly to the need for fundamental organizational change in policing.

The Economics of Policing Summit that was launched by the Public Safety Canada has begun a process of review and research that is intended to support a change agenda involving the federal government, civilian governing authorities, police executives, and other public safety stakeholders.

Economics of Policing

The Council of Canadian Academies has organized an Expert Panel on the Future of Canadian Policing Models which will work toward answering the basic question: "Given the evolution of crime, the justice system, and society, what does current evidence and knowledge suggest about the future of the public policing models used in Canada?"

Expert Panel on the Future of Canadian Policing Models

These, and other, initiatives designed to examine some of clearly pressing challenges facing policing in Canada as the economic downturn combines with a pattern of declining crime rates to create circumstances where meaningful change is both warranted and responsible.

Accordingly, we may anticipate that there will be change of some magnitude introduced across the landscape of Canadian policing. It may not be as exhaustive or transformational as some policy analysts might expect. It may not represent a "re-imagining" of the policing enterprise in a manner that was seen in the 1980s when the philosophy of community policing began to really take hold of some innovative police leaders and their organizations. However, regardless of the degree to which change occurs, there will be a requirement for those in charge of change to deal with the inevitable resistance to change. We know, from the writings of police academics like Dorothy Guyot that changing police organizations is akin to "bending granite" therefore a refresher on the research and practice of resistance to organizational change is in order.

To that end, it is worthwhile considering the following article:

Erwin, Dennis G. and Andrew N. Garman (2010). "Resistance to organizational change: linking research and practice." Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 39-56.

The authors have undertaken a literature review using some specific databases in order to arrive at relevant articles dealing with topics around resistance to organizational change. This led them to 123 articles that met the criteria established for this purpose. However, upon further review, the authors narrowed their focus to a group of 18 articles considered useful for their immediate consideration.

One 2007 survey found that among 1,536 executives, who had been involved in some form of organizational change initiative, on 38% asssessed the initiative as successful. Furthermore, only 30% of those executives felt that they contributed to sustained improvements in their organization. This certainly tells us that successful organizational change is not only difficult to achieve, it is hard to sustain, and often fails to include everyone in its scope.

We are reminded of the early groundbreaking work of Kurt Lewin and M. Gold and their three-stage model of organizational change; which involves unfreezing, moving, and freezing phases. Lewin's work, in particular, is extremely useful for arriving at a clear understanding of organizational change processes, and the psychological underpinnings of much of our human (all too human) reactions to change. Lewin is also responsible for some helpful theorizing around the concept of 'force field analysis' which considers the larger context in which organizational changes occur.

Kurt Lewin

It is important to focus on the individual's behaviours, needs, values, and motivation when considering resistance to organizational change. Several authors have formulated different approaches that attempt to discern aspects of resistance to change:

In the context of change, we may consider a four-stage model that includes: anticipation, confirmation, culmination, and aftermath. Each of these stages has their own characteristics and in the realm of (post)modern Canadian policing we are currently struggling with the confirmation phase where the absolute necessity for reform is under discussion, debate, and dialogue.

It is also useful to acknowledge that resistance to change may actually be turned to productive purposes through a challenge to goals, objectives, and plans. This is somewhat of the gadfly effect that can produce improved results. It is not at all surprising that Canadian police leaders are offering some degree of push-back with regard to fundamental change within their field of expertise. This is especially the case for Canadian police associations as they grapple with the implications of proposals for major transformations in the ways that policing is delivered across the country, including such concepts as 'tiered policing' or alternate delivery models which may erode the pre-eminence of fully-sworn police officers.

Certainly, there are cognitive, behavioural, and affective dimensions to resistance and many individuals may experience considerable ambivalence in face of organization change. This has been experienced in major police change initiatives, such as the Ontario Provincial Police's Organizational Review process which took place in the 1990s under OPP Commissioner Tom O'Grady. This initiative was derivative of the larger Social Contract exercise set in motion by the Bob Rae NDP government and was viewed by many as an attempt to force the OPP to find savings that were not necessary, not justified, and not conducive to public safety. However, in spite of these doubts and in the face of considerable organizational resistance, the leadership of the OPP proceeded to define itself as being engaged in ten (10) "business lines" and applied, among other things, the then popular concept of business process re-engineering (articulated by Michael Prince and James Champy) to re-design not only the OPP's processes but also its organizational structure. This was a powerful learning experience for the members of the OPP who were involved in the enterprise and allowed this police service to better align itself in a cost-effective manner and one that further institutionalized the philosophy of community policing.

Aspects of personal resilience, self-concept, and risk tolerance are considered important for those who are about to confront organizational change. Of course, these are qualities that are not uncommon for effective leaders in any organization. In Canadian policing, they may be found in those individuals who demonstrate leadership qualities and a capacity to weather the 'storms' of organizational change.

Erwin and Garman also point to these additional qualities for those who are more likely to succeed (and perhaps thrive) in this context: openness to experience; lower risk aversion; and higher tolerance of ambiguity. Furthermore, they see the useful role played by both humour and positive anticipation as beneficial, adaptive defense mechanisms. On the negative side, denial, dissociation, isolation of affect, projection, and acting out serve as negative defense mechanisms. Clearly, police leaders who are in a position to shepherd through organizational change initiatives must be possessed of the positive characteristics, while being simultaneously on the lookout for those negative ones. This means being capable of a degree of self-analysis and introspection.

The authors of the article under discussion emphasize that information is gold in these circumstances. Communication should become almost a fetish to ensure that people are on board, individuals are engaged in the change process, and that details about the process of change and the likely outcomes of the change are constantly before people's eyes.

Erwin and Garman provide considerable detail on the difficulties associated with a lack of trust in management which may be the produce of skepticism and cynicism. These are considerations that are not unfamiliar to Canadian police leaders. There is a strong sub-text of skepticism and cynicism in the realm of policing by nature and these aspects may be intensified and heightened during periods of organizational change. Certainly, there has been no shortage of both skepticism and cynicism throughout the lead-up to the Economics of Policing initiative launched recently through Public Safety Canada.

The ability of management to lead the organization through the change continuum is not always clearly accepted nor apparent. Many instances may be highlighted where the rank-and-file within a police service have questioned (both internally and publically) the capacity of senior police management to deliver of organizational change initiatives. There was a period within Canadian policing where police associations were launching 'non-confidence' votes against their respective chiefs of police with the basic message: we as a union do not believe that the CEO has the wherewithal to lead our police organization. Clearly, if police reforms are going to evolve from such undertakings as the Economics of Policing in Canada, there will have to be a great deal of confidence in the abilities of the country's police executives to make these reforms work in a meaningful and measureable manner.

In order to offer some practice guidelines for change agents and managers, Erwin and Garman have distilled their research to point to the following key aspects:

• plan for resistance;
• provide additional support;
• gain support and help;
• address individuals' concerns;
• provide support & training;
• communicate;
• ensure understanding of the change;
• examine policies & behaviours for consistency;
• encourage & allow opportunities for participation in the change process;
• develop confidence & trust;
• emphasize more effective management styles; and
• develop quality manager-employee relationships

Police leaders in Canada will surely be called upon to deliver some level of organizational change over the next few years in order to respond to the challenges that are being placed before them by civilian governing bodies, police oversight groups, politicians (municipal, regional, provincial, and federal), academics, and other stakeholder groups. A close and careful reading of the kind of study prepared by Erwin and Garman may prove highly educational for those leaders as they contemplate how they will operate in this new environment.

Twitter & Modern Policing: New Research

In June 2013 the UK policy think-tank, Demos, published a new report that should be of considerable interest to Canadian police organizations: @MetpoliceUK: how twitter is changing modern policing: the case of the Woolwich aftermatch by Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller.

http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/metpoliceuk

A word about Demos is useful at this point as it represents something noticably absent on the Canadian policy landscape. This is a progressive entity that undertakes substantial research on public policy issues and takes an "all-party" perspective. Their projects range from austerity measures, through crime and public safety, to residential care, and welfare.

The publication cited above is an extremely timely offering that provides readers with some much-needed insight into how this form of social media may be utilized by police organizations for a variety of purposes.

We have seen many so-called "twitcidents" occuring around the globe. In Vancouver, the Vancouver Police Department made consider use of social media intelligence (or, SOCMINT) following the devastating riot that followed the Stanley Cup playoffs in 2012.

Of considerable value is this publication's dissection of the flood of tweets that surrounded the death of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, England on May 22, 2013. Rigby was a drummer with the Royal Regiment of Fusilliers and his murder occurred in broad daylight. Lee Rigby

The authors of this report have downloaded and categorized all 19,344 tweets that included @metpoliceUK from May 17 to 23, 2013. This method of collecting, coding, and analyzing relevant tweets is an important technique that may prove commonplace for police organizations in the future. The researchers gave considerable thought to the ethics associated with this project and came to the conclusion that, given the inherent nature of tweets and the public status of the Met, there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy among the tweeters. In any event, the authors were diligent in stripping any identifiers from the tweets they have analysed in this report.

We are increasingly being informed by what researchers have taken to calling 'souveillance' which amounts to the recording of police actions by members of the public using various forms of technology. The events surrounding the deaths of Robert Dziekanski in Canada, Ian Tomlinson in the UK, and others are the direct result of this 'souveillance' by citizens equipped with recording equipment, like smart phones.

The authors of the Demos report include several recommendations that will benefit police organizations, or their civilian governing authorities, in relation to social media intelligence, including:

• establish the human and technological infrastructure to deal effectively with the social media aftermath of emergency situation. Essential to have a single point of contact within the organization;
• develop centralized capacity for SOCMINT; and
• Home Office should create a clear framework for the collection and use of SOCMINT across the UK's forty-three (43) police services.

Technological advances in social media have created an excellent tool for incoming and outgoing communications in modern police organizations. This publication demonstrates that social media will place increasing expectations upon police services to engage with the public using this platform. Twitter also offers some scope for investigative approaches that may harness the stream of information that flows from this type of source.

UK Policing Conference, September 2013

On September 23 & 24, 2013 the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is hosting an 'Excellence in Policing' conference around the theme: "Missing the Targets?...Let's Remember the Point." This event will take place in Ryton-on-Dunsmore and represents a gathering which should prompt Canadian police leaders to wish to be sent to Coventry.

Specific details on this event, and related initiatives sponsored by the ACPO and Excellence in Policing may be found at:

http://www.excellenceinpolicing.org.uk/

What is fascinating about this particular ACPO conference is that it maps out an approach to grappling with the present challenges of modern policing in a forthright and highly collaborative manner. The first day begins with an articulation of various insights and expectations that relate to policing in the UK from key vantage points, including: the Minister of State for Policing & Criminal Justice; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC); the Association of Police & Crime Commissioners Board, and the ACPO. Of course, there is nothing new about having key stakeholders involved in such high-level gatherings to speculate on the future of policing. What makes this planned event important is the substantial nature of the themes and elements outlined for participants.

The following topics are on the Agenda for the 'Current & Future Demands' portion of this conference:

• Changing nature of demand;
• The financial outlook & what it means;
• Horizon scanning;
• Mutual gain: the case for active citizenship;
• Cybercrime & cyber-policing;
• Demand resulting from mental ill-health & dementia;
• Integrating evidence-based practice & performance management;
• Freeing up police time; and
• Matching resources to demand: new ideas for workforce planning

Under the Theme 'Models & Methods of Service Delivery' there are several important discussions planned:

• There is no one policing model any more...there are lots of them;
• A review of force and Commissioners' perspectives on police-private sector partnerships;
• commissioning police services;
• Integrated service delivery: making it work;
• Public-private partnership: a case study;
• Issues from HMIC's Valuing the Police

The second day (September 24th) includes two themes that should generate both good discussion and significant insights:

Theme 3: Is It Working?

1. Performance Management Business Area (PMBA) commission on performance;
2. The transparency agenda;
3. HMIC oversight & PMBA ForceSight;
4. Insights into working behaviours;
5. The state and status of user satisfaction surveys;
6. Evidence: where is it? what is it?

Theme 4: Leading into the Future

1. Digital pathfinders: creative use of digital data;
2. Corruption: what it is and how to tackle it;
3. Why middle leaders matter;
4. The future senior leaders, including direct entry;
5. Fostering innovation;
6. Social media: what leaders need to do

During the recent (January 2013) National Summit on the Economics of Policing, hosted by Public Safety Canada in Ottawa there were several keynote speakers from the UK who spoke about the experiences of their police organzations in the face of the pressing fiscal realities that are pressing upon all public services. These representatives were articulate, action-oriented, and accomplished in their approach to these challenges. There are many talented police leaders in Canada who are increasingly alive to the notion that fundamental change is warranted in our predominant policing model. They are beginning to take what may be termed an architectonic view of (post) modern policing and understand that new modes and orders will be necessary if our country's policing is to be sustainable. It is encouraging that the UK has taken steps toward a future vision of policing that departs from the status quo. It is highly appropriate for Canadian police leaders, academics, and policy-makers to look to these pioneering efforts.

The UK's New College of Policing: Or, Why Don't We Have One?

Building upon an earlier blog from November 2012, the UK continues to demonstrate leadership through continued innovations coming out of the new College of Policing.

This entity took over many of the roles and responsibilities previously carried out under the auspices of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). It has wisely, and usefully, continued the monthly publication of the Digest which, as its name suggests, offers up-to-date summaries of police legislation, as well as, reports and information on policing operations and advances in criminal justice. Of course, circumstances alter cases in Canadian policing law and practice. However, Canadian police leaders may learn a great deal from what is transpiring in another common law jurisdiction which following the Westminster traditions. Topics like child sexual exploitation, undercover policing operations, surveillance camera code of conduct, intelligence services and other matters of interest provide excellent background research and evidence for Canadian police organizations.

The College of Policing is becoming increasingly more active in coordinating and contributing to the multitude of activities and initiatives designed to improve policing in the UK. The College's CEO, Alex Marshall, has been proactive in leading this new entity toward improvements in the overall quality of policing in this jurisdiction. The College's website: www.college.police.uk is a true gold-mine of resources for Canadian police practitioners and academics. It also highlights that current reality that Canada does not have a strong centre of gravity for its policing research and study.

Indeed, the UK offers our country a truly leading example of what might be accomplished when the notion of the 'economics of policing' is taken seriously. Earlier in July 2013, the College of Police responded to a report published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) dealing with "Valuing the Police" which includes submissions from all police services across the UK. This is an evidence-based demonstration that these diverse police organizations are working hard to produce savings in the delivery of this vital service, while also protecting public safety, workforce safety, and ensuring quality service delivery. The HMIC's national report: Policing in austerity: rising to the challenge, and the reports submitted by the forty-three (43) individual British police services may be accessed at: www.hmic.gov.uk.programmes/value-for-money/policing-in-austerity-rising-to-the-challenge/

Canadian police leaders, including the executives of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Canadian Association of Police Boards, and the Canadian Police Association should all be looking very closely at the UK's College of Policing and asking themselves; Why can't we cooperate to create a Canadian equivalent of this vital agency?

Dr. Frank Straub Heading to Spokane, Washington

A recent announcement indicates that the Mayor of Spokane, Washington is recommending that Frank Straub be confirmed by Council as the new Chief of Police for that city:

http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/aug/23/mayor-selects-straub-to-lead-police/?print-friendly

This is excellent news for the citizens of Spokane as Straub has an extensive background in policing and public safety that will surely benefit this jurisdiction.

Straub's wide-ranging experience includes engagement as a Special Agent with the US Naval Investigative Service, Office of the Inspector General, US Department of Justice, NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Training, Commissioner of Public Safety, City of White Plains (NY), and Chief of Police in Indianapolis. With a Ph.D. in criminal justice from the City University of New York, Straub is an extremely well-rounded police executive with a great deal to insight geared toward innovative, ethical and progressive policing.

It will be interesting to watch his evolution as he takes the reins in this department.

British Home Office Unveils College of Policing

Earlier this month, the Home Office in the UK announced the creation of a new body that would aim to advance professionalism among the forty-three police services in that country:

College of Policing

The College of Policing was created to provide some concentrated response to the clear need for significant change within policing at the national level. It will include representation from the police service, the Association of Chief Police Officers, and the Superintendents' Association. The College will operate independent from government and legislation is expected to be in place by December 2012.

While not a "rebranding" of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), the newly created College will certainly inherit some of the key functions performed by the NPIA designed to maintain and sustain a broad range of policing skills. It may be hoped that the College will continue to publish the monthly Digest which is an excellent source of research awareness that serves the international policing community.

Among the formal purposes anticipated for the College are the following:

• protecting the public interest;
• setting and enhancing first-class national standards of professionalism to ensure excellence in operational policing;
• identifying evidence of what works in policing and share best [sic] practice;
• supporting the education and professional development of police officers and staff; and
• enabling and motivating staff and partners to work together to achieve a shared purpose.

Canadian police executives and their political counterparts should be keeping a very close eye on this new development in Great Britain as we evolve toward constructing our own approaches to a "new professionalism" in policing.

Paying for Canadian Policing: It's Getting Beyond Us

 

In June 2012, the RCMP Pay Council published the results of its research on police compensation in Canada. What is interesting, but not surprising, is how closely clustered all police services in this country are in terms of compensation. What is both surprising and interesting is not only the fact that these salaries are becoming quite high, but also that the RCMP, which is without any formal police union (or association) to represent their collective bargaining interests, is near the top of the pay scale.

This report indicates that the total compensation (per hour values, which includes cash, pension, & group benefits) for the top-ranked police services is as follows:

Police Service                    Total Compensation           % vs. RCMP


1. Toronto                           71.14                                  8.05%
2. Vancouver                      70.89                                  7.69%
3. OPP                                66.62                                 1.19%
4. RCMP                             65.83                                  0.00%
5. Winnipeg                         63.08                                 -4.19%
6. Halifax                             59.28                                 -9.96%
7. SQ                                   58.73                                 -10.79%
8. Edmonton                        58.24                                 -11.53%
9. Montreal                          57.54                                 -12.60%

Certainly, the quite favourable compensation package secured for the RCMP tends to argue against the necessity for a police union to represent officers' collective bargaining interests. Other police departments with apparently strong and active police unions have not been able to secure salary and benefits package as generous as those negotiated for RCMP officers.

Another point to raise is that these figures represent First Class Constable compensation rates. It does not include overtime and therefore when reading these numbers it is essential to consider that most officers will be able to post earnings in excess of $100,000.00 annually with little overtime, or paid duty, effort. Also, once an officer begins to progress through the ranks, these compensation packages are increasingly more generous.

Enhancing RCMP Accountability -- Let's See What Bill C-42 Can Do

On June 22nd, 2012, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews introduced Bill C-42 Enhancing RCMP Accountability Act.


This proposed piece of legislation is 126 pages in length and really does amount to some degree of police reform for Canada's police service. However, it may immediately be suggested that this bill may be trying to square the circle and will not accomplish the truly fundamental cultural, organizational, operational, and functional change that is required by the RCMP.


I had the opportunity to speak with Gregor Craigie, the guest host of CBC's 'Early Edition' radio program in Vancouver on June 26th and presented my perspective on this new legislation:


CBC Early Edition -- June 26, 2012


To add to this exchange, I offer the following further details.


Bill C-42 is police reform in two parts:


1. Seeking to strengthen the RCMP's earlier review body (i.e., the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP) and implement a framework for handling investigations of serious incidents involving RCMP officers.
2. Striving to modernize discipline, grievance and human resource management processes within the RCMP to prevent, address, and correct performance and conduct issues.


I'm more immediately concerned with the new (so-called) Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) which is being proposed. In my interview with the CBC, I observed that perhaps the word Civilian should be placed in quotation marks: "Civilian" as it remains to be seen to what extent the CRCC will be staffed with civilian members. Certainly the Chair and the (up to) four members will be civilians, not unlike several other civilian oversight bodies currently in place across Canada. However, the people actually tasked with doing the investigations could turn out to be seconded, or retired, police officers. To my way of thinking, these people cannot be viewed as true civilians. It may be worthwhile to consider the recommendation of the McDonald Commission in 1977, dealing with the removal of national security from the RCMP and the creation of a new body to deal with these sensitive and vital matters. When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was actually created, there were many former RCMP Security Service officers who simply transitioned to the new organization, bringing their police training, culture and challenges with them into the machinery of this supposedly "civilian" entity.


Certainly, on paper, the CRCC will be an improvement on the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. The new body will have much more robust powers and will have the capacity to function along the lines of a court. Therefore, the CRCC may subpoena witnesses, compel the production of documents and examine issues in a more extensive manner. The Chair of this new body will be able to activate its own investigative powers, or, may work in conjunction with other agencies. This is particularly important in light of the recent developments in several jurisdictions across Canada where strong civilian oversight bodies have been created.


Again, this may become something of a distinction without a difference. While there truly are civilians involved with CRCC at the top level it's where the investigations are actually accomplished that we should be seeing more of an effort to ensure a deep civilian element. Some of the other civilian oversight bodies across Canada provide useful parallels, for example:


British Columbia


The newly created Independent Investigations Office (IIO) came into being through British Columbia Bill 12 -- 2011, the Police (Independent Investigations Office) Amendment Act, 2011. The chief civilian director of this body is indeed a civilian. In fact, Richard Rosenthal is a former American prosecutor with considerable experience in the United States with police oversight bodies and brings a wealth of experience to his new portofolio. Also, the legislation allows Rosenthal's position to appoint individuals to serve as investigators and there is provision for civilians "with investigative experience" in support of the IIO. However, the civilian director may also appoint former members of a police or law enforcement agency outside of British Columbia and/or former members of the RCMP. Time will tell if the IIO is able to fasten upon suitably skilled civilians to take on these challenging investigative roles.


Alberta


In this province, the Serious Incident Response Team (SIRT) is headed by Clifton Purvis, a former Crown attorney. In carrying out their mandate, SIRT has several seconded police officers from the local police services (e.g., Calgary and Edmonton), the RCMP, as well as, retired police officers serving as investigators. To my knowledge there are no civilians working within the Alberta SIRT as investigators.


Ontario


One of the earliest civilian oversight bodies is the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). It has had an interesting history with some highly controversial issues arising due to the nature of its work and the struggle to clearly define its proper purpose and relationship with Ontario's police services. Again, the lion's share of SIU investigators are former police officers. This reality has featured in the examination carried out by a former SIU director, Andre Marin during his tenure as Ontario's Ombudsman.


Nova Scotia


Recently, the Province of Nova Scotia introduced legislation creating its own Serious Incident Response Team (SiRT) modelled quite closely upon the Alberta SIRT experiment. In Nova Scotia the civilian head of SiRT is Ronald MacDonald a former Crown who has been charged with leading this organization. All of the investigators in this unit are either seconded police officers or former officers, no civlian investigative staff have been engaged to conduct the work of this "civilian" agency.


Police Investigating Police Research


Certainly, the research conducted by my colleague Chris Murphy (Dalhousie University) and myself on behalf of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP in 2008 clearly shows that the police must have a vital role to play in any credible, competent, constructive oversight body. The typology we developed moved from the completely internal (police-driven) model to a completely civilian (police excluded) approach. The research pointed out that the most efficacious approaches were those that acknowledged the pivotal role the police themselves play in the process. However, the research also stressed that the public no longer accept a system of police investigating police. Therefore, increasingly, civilians will have to become part of the investigative equation and have the fullest range of knowledge, skills, and abilities for this purpose.


In Britian, for instance, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has civilians on strength to conduct the investigations. Their work is considered complete and competent. In fact the IPCC asserts that 75% of its investigative staff should be civilians, not retired police officers. It may be possible to assert that there is nothing magical, mysterious, or mystical about the process of investigation. More careful study of those police oversight bodies that do engage civilian investigators would be useful to provide solid evidence around this assertion.


Should Bill C-42 pass, it will be quite interesting to see how it moves from theory to practice. Of course, a key indicator will be the quality of the Chairperson and her/his other members. But more to the point, who will be conducting the actual investigations and how will their activity resonate with the public interest?


Time will certainly tell!

James Q. Wilson Dies

The news of the death of James Q. Wilson will surely renew interest in the famous "Broken Windows" thesis that he developed in collaboration with George Kelling:

James Q. Wilson Dies

However, Wilson was a social scientist whose interests ranged widely and he should be equally remembered for his important work on policing as expressed in the publication: Varieties of Police Behavior: the Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities published by the Harvard University Press in 1968.

His legacy is pivotal in that he brought a serious social science perspective to bear on the actual work of police departments and was viewed as credible by police organizations while maintaining a solid academic reputation.

Policing in 2020

The Policy Exchange, in collaboration with PA Consulting Group, has published a most useful summary considering the future of policing (2011):

Policing 2020: the future of policing

This document provides some clear perspective on the following elements and outlines the discussion questions used to generate the points summarized:

1. The evolving policing landscape
2. The police mission
3. Responsibilities of policing
4. Policing delivery & governance

One essential aspect of this discussion involves the need to recognize that conventional approaches to the public police mandate/mission will need to evolve. Other service providers, including local authorities, private security, civilian employees, and corporations will become better positioned to deliver certain aspects of what public police organizations hold responsibility for in the current scheme.

There is a constant refrain that public policing arrangements are no longer sustainability. This reality exists outside of the immediate economic pressures as it needs to be contextualized within the framework of steadily declining crime rates in virtually every jurisdiction.

Pressure to innovate in policing is difficult, remembering Dorothy Guyot's image of "bending granite" as the overarching metaphor. And when civilian governing authorities, police executives, and police associations/unions all represent "elites" that must be somehow accommodated the process is manifestly complicated. This does not even factor in the public perspective on what is needed for a viable model of policing for the future.

New RCMP Commissioner Continues Candour

I had the opportunity to take part in a Radio Canada International feature on the recent comments by RCMP Commissioner Robert Paulson dealing with his aggessive plans for change within the organization:

http://www.rcinet.ca/english/column/the-link-s-top-stories/18-00_2011-12-20-canadarsquo-s-top-mountie-set-to-burnish-rcmprsquo-s-tarnished-image/

Based upon an understanding of Paulson's strongly worded discussion with the Globe & Mail's Editorial Board.

This story will continue to unfold, however, we need to applaud Paulson for making every effort to lead in a dramatically different manner than his predecessors.

RCMP Commissioner Robert Paulson

Oversight Overdone

This week, the Ontario Ombudsman has once again proven that he's incapable to leaving well enough alone when it comes to a public agency which he headed in the past:

Ombudsman Looks at SIU

In his report, entitled, Oversight Undermined, Andre Marin takes aim at the Ontario Attorney General and the manner in which it has handled the ongoing, and often quite intense, friction between the Province's police leaders (including unions) and the current SIU Director, Ian Scott. Of course, it may be worthwhile to have some considered examination of the operation of the SIU and the specific matters that appear to be problematic around suspect officer notes and the nature of the legal representation of officers involved with incidents that fall within the ambit of the SIU.

Of course, the present Ontario Ombudsman is a masterful showman and certainly relishes the 'limelight' in a way that seems to ensure that his desire for publicity will not be blunted by reason, nor by the reality that the Ontario Special Investigations Unit is ultra vires to his office.

However, the Ontario Ombudsman has no clearly defined mandate to look at the SIU. His office is not legislated to include policing matters. It is particularly inappropriate for the current Ontario Ombudsman to concern himself with this brief since he was himself the Director of the SIU during an equally troubled period. Mr. Marin should in all conscience leave the presenting matters to others who have a legitimate role to play in the resolution of these issues. The Ombudsman would be well to review the decision of Mr. Justice Binnie in the case of R. v. Regan where he speaks about the function of a "Minister of Justice" and the qualities that should be demonstrated. It is painfully obvious that Mr. Marin a degree of animus to his broadside against the Ontario Government in the context of the SIU. This alone should disqualify his office from further engagement with this particular file.

Discussing the New RCMP Commissioner

The clip below is a recent interview with Garth Materie on the CBC Radio program "Blue Sky" out of Saskatoon:

http://www.cbc.ca/bluesky/2011/11/17/the-rcmps-top-cop/

It's a useful overall perspective on the initial commentary by new RCMP Commissioner Robert Paulson and allows me the opportunity to parse some of this early exposure to the new top officer with this important organization.